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SUMMARY 
 
 
The meaning of the term “benefits” in the context of unfair labour practice 
jurisprudence, having previously been unsettled for more than a decade, has now 
been settled by the Labour Appeal Court in the Apollo.1  
 
Prior to Apollo,2 our courts have struggled to adopt a stance to maintain the 
distinction between disputes of rights and disputes of interest as separate 
compartments.  The prevalent view at that stage was that, in order for an employee 
to lodge a dispute at the CCMA or Bargaining Council the employee would have to 
show that he or she had a right to the benefit that arises by virtue of contract, statute 
or collective agreement, failing which the CCMA or a Bargaining Council would not 
have the jurisdiction to determine the dispute, in which case it may constitute a 
dispute of interest and the employee will have to embark on an industrial action to 
secure a benefit. 
 
Apollo3 endorsed a previous decision of the Labour Court,4 i.e. by placing “benefits” 
into the following two categories: 
 
(1) Where the dispute is about a demand by employees concerning their benefits, it 
can be settled by way of industrial action. 
 
(2) Where the dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct, it must be 
settled by way of adjudication or arbitration.  
 
As a result of the above categorisation, the CCMA or Bargaining Council may 
adjudicate a dispute relating to benefits where there is a pre-existing benefit and the 
employer refuses to comply with its obligation towards the employer in that regard.  It 
may also adjudicate disputes relating to the provision of a car allowance (i.e. where 
                                                     
1  Apollo Tyres v CCMA (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC). 
2  Supra. 
3  Supra. 
4  Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA [2005] 7 BLLR 703 (LC). 
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the employer retains the discretion to grant or withhold the allowance) and disputes 
relating to the provision of bonuses (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to 
grant or withhold the bonus). 
 
In this treatise, I set out the history and development of the legislation in relation to 
the concept of “benefits” (in the context of unfair labour practice) so as to understand 
how our Labour Appeal Court has now come to settle the issues above. 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
The concept of “benefits” in the context of unfair labour practice, has been grappled 
with by the South African Labour Courts, Labour Appeal Court and the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the “CCMA”) for 
more than a decade.  
 
Our courts have struggled to adopt a stance to maintain the distinction between 
disputes of rights and disputes of interest as separate and pure compartments. 
 
The position has now been settled by the Labour Appeal Court.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
In this treatise, I focus on the following questions, with reference to the development 
of the relevant law and the current stance in South Africa, namely: 
 
(1) Does the term “benefit” constitute a right to which an employee is entitled? 
 
(2) Are aggrieved employees entitled to refer disputes relating to privileges and 
advantages awarded by an employer, to the CCMA? And 
 
(3) How must disputes relating to benefits be resolved?  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
(1) What is the history of the Unfair Labour Practice in South Africa? 
 
  2 
(2) How has the labour legislation, in relation to unfair labour practice and benefits, 
developed over the years?  
 
(3) What are the elements of unfair labour practice? 
 
(4) What are “benefits”? 
 
(5) How are benefits interpreted by the CCMA and our Labour Courts? 
 
(6) What is the current stance of unfair labour practice relating to benefits in South 
Africa?  
 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of this treatise is to set out the history and development of the legislation in 
relation to the concept of “benefits” (in the context of unfair labour practice) so as to 
understand how our Labour Appeal Court has now come to settle the issues set out 
in the Problem Statement in paragraph 1.2 above. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The resources used in obtaining the relevant research material for this treatise were 
sourced online, through LexisNexis Butterworths, and also from text books, articles, 
case law and statutes set out in this treatise.  
 
In regard to the major pieces of legislation relevant to the treatise topic, I used the 
Labour Relations Act5 and the Constitution6 as a starting point and then referred to 
preceding legislation when addressing the development of the law in relation to the 
treatise topic. 
 
                                                     
5  66 of 1995. 
6  Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
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In regard to the case law relevant to this treatise, I used the cases relied on and 
referred to by the Labour Appeal Court in the Apollo7 case as a starting point. I also 
used relevant case law when addressing the development of the law in relation to the 
treatise topic. 
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH 
 
The major statutes used in this treatise include the Labour Relations Act,8 the 
Constitution9 and the legislation which preceded these Acts, including, but not limited 
to, the Industrial Conciliation Acts,10 the earlier Labour Relations Acts11 (and various 
amendment acts) and the interim Constitution12. 
 
The case law primarily used in this treatise, were sourced from the cases relied on 
and referred to by the Labour Appeal Court in the Apollo13 case and by various 
authors. 
 
                                                     
7  Apollo Tyres v CCMA (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC). 
8  66 of 1995. 
9  Act 108 of 1996. 
10  Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924; Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937; Industrial 
Conciliation Act 54 of 1952 and Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
11  Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 and Labour Relations Act 94 of 1979. 
12  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
13  Apollo Tyres v CCMA (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC).  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to grasp a good understanding of unfair labour practice relating to benefits, it 
is important to understand the history and development of the concept of “unfair 
labour practice” in isolation.  The concept of “benefits” is introduced in Chapter 3 and 
is more comprehensively addressed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
 
2.2 TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW POSITION 
 
The traditional sources of South African labour law are routed in our common law, 
being Roman Law and Roman Dutch Law.14  In Roman Law the concepts of locatio 
conductio operis and locatio conductio operarum regulate the letting and hiring of 
labour.15 
 
Locatio conductio operis is the letting and hiring of a particular piece of work or job in 
terms of which the employee undertook to perform a particular job as a whole for the 
employer in consideration for an agreed remuneration.  
 
Locatio conductio operarum is the letting and hiring of services of a person in terms 
of which an employee undertakes to place his personal services for a certain period 
of time at the disposal of an employer, for payment of remuneration as agreed 
between the parties.  
 
In terms of the locatio conductio operarum, the subject matter of the contract is the 
labour or services, constituting an employment contract which would, today, be 
governed by South African labour legislation such as the Labour Relations Act.16  In 
locatio conductio operis the subject matter is the execution and performance of a 
                                                     
14  Van Warmello An Introduction to the Principles of Roman Civil Law (1976) 478. 
15  Supra. 
16  66 of 1995. 
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particular piece of work or job, constituting an independent contractor agreement 
which would, today, not fall subject to South African labour legislation but, instead, 
the law of contract.  
 
Traditional common law does not recognize the notions of fairness and equity in the 
workplace.  Traditional common law is premised on pure contractual principles, 
limiting the parties’ enforceable rights and obligations to what is stated in the contract 
of employment.  Therefore, any agreed remuneration and/or benefits could be 
agreed in the employment contract to be adjusted periodically in line with inflation.  In 
terms of traditional common law, an employee may not claim that fairness requires 
an adjustment.  The employment contract would determine the relationship between 
an employer and employee for the term of the employment, unless the employment 
contract is amended by mutual agreement.  Traditionally, employees could not rely 
on remedies if they were victims of unfair conduct by employers, unless that unfair 
conduct also constitutes a breach or repudiation of the contract.17  Apart from 
recognizing the duty of good faith, the common law did not traditionally recognize 
fairness as an element of an employment contract. Employers and employees were 
therefore obliged to comply with the terms of the employment contract they had 
concluded, even if such terms were unfair, inequitable or one-sided.   
 
2.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TO THE COMMON LAW 
 
(1) The Constitution18 and subsequent legislation, such as the Labour Relations 
Act,19 developed the common law and incorporated the element of fairness into 
employment contracts.  Therefore, every contract of employment was 
considered to contain a right to a fair pre-dismissal procedure and fair labour 
practice.  Fairly recently however, the (South African) Supreme Court of Appeal 
differentiated between those rights contained in the Labour Relations Act20 to 
those imposed by the common law, so as to avoid a duplication of rights.  A 
summary of these Supreme Court of Appeal cases are as follows: 
                                                     
17  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 2nd ed (2007) 41. 
18  Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
19  66 of 1995. 
20  Ibid. 
  6 
 
(a) In 2004 in the case of Denel (Pty) Ltd v Vorster,21 and again in 2007 in the 
case of Old Mutual v Gumbi,22 the SCA maintained that the Common Law 
rights of employment should be developed in compliance with the 
Constitutional principles to align the law with fundamental Constitutional 
rights.  The Supreme Court of Appeal maintained a view, for a brief period, 
that every contract of employment contains an implied right to a fair pre-
dismissal procedure and impliedly imposes on employers a general 
obligation to treat employees fairly. 
 
(b) In the case of Boxer Superstores Mthatha & Another,23 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal held that the Labour Relations Act’s24 remedies against unfair 
labour practice are not exhaustive.  It might be available to an employee in 
an employment relationship and the particular conduct may not only 
constitute an unfair labour practice (for which the Labour Relations Act25 
provides remedies), but may give rise to other causes of action, provided 
an employee’s claim does not purport to be one that falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court as set out in the Labour 
Relations Act.26  This decision was supported and applied in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Murray v Minister of Defence.27 
 
(c) In the 2010 case of SAMSA v McKenzie28 however, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal came to a different conclusion.  Here the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found no basis for the contention that common law principles and the 
Constitutional right to fair labour practice to be incorporated into contract 
of employments by implication.  The court held that this was not the 
intention of the legislature as it would create a duplication of rights, which 
would be protected by statute and common law simultaneously.  
                                                     
21  Denel (Pty) Ltd v Vorster (2004) 25 ILJ 659 (SCA). 
22  Old Mutual Co SA v Gumbi [2007] 8 BLLR 699 (SCA). 
23  Boxer Superstores Mthatha & Another v Mbenya (2007) ILJ 2209 (SCA). 
24  66 of 1995. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
27  [2008] 6 BLLR 513 (SCA). 
28  SAMSA v McKenzie [2010] 3 All SA 1 (SCA). 
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(2) I disagree with the decision in SAMSA v McKenzie29 i.e. that allowing the 
common law principles of fairness to be incorporated in employment contracts 
creates a duplication of rights.  The Labour Relations Act30 was established 
pursuant to section 23 of the Constitution31 and the Constitutional right to fair 
labour practice is simply applied through legislation such as the Labour 
Relations Act.32  Therefore applying the common law principles of fairness in 
employment contracts is an application of both Constitutional rights and those 
rights contained in the Labour Relations Act.33 
 
2.4 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The Industrial Conciliation Act, 192434 was the first labour statute enacted in South 
Africa.  It was, however, in force during apartheid and applied to white South African 
people, excluding employees of African origin.  This Act made provision for the 
Minister of Labour to set minimum wage rates and maximum work hours, on 
recommendation of an industrial council conciliation board.  The purpose of this Act 
was to provide protection for white employees who were, at the time, being undercut 
by cheap African labour.  Councils and conciliation boards were tasked with the duty 
to resolve disputes under this Act. 
 
The definition of unfair labour practice in the Industrial Conciliation Act, 192435 was 
very wide.  It was defined as “anything the industrial court deemed to be an unfair 
labour practice”.  The object of this definition was to confer on the newly created 
Industrial Court, and later the Labour Appeal Court and the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court as it was known at that time, the power to fashion on a casuistic 
basis an equity-based jurisprudence for the South African workplace.36   
 
                                                     
29  SAMSA v McKenzie [2010] 3 All SA 1 (SCA). 
30  66 of 1995. 
31  Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
32  66 of 1995. 
33  Ibid. 
34  11 of 1924. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 41. 
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The Industrial Conciliation Act37 was replaced by the consolidated Industrial 
Conciliation Act, 193738 however, no significant changes were made.   
 
The Botha Commission was established in 1971 to address the labour problems 
faced under the Industrial Conciliation Act.39  Following findings and 
recommendations of the Botha Commission, the Native Laws Amendment Act,40 
which extended the influx control to African women thereby removing the status of 
employee accorded to them by the Industrial Conciliation Act,41 and the Native 
Labour Settlement Dispute Act42 was enacted.  These statutes created a separate 
dispensation for African workers, establishing plant-based works committees, and 
Regional Native Labour Committees and the Central Native Labour Board.   
 
2.5 THE CONCEPT OF “FAIRNESS”   
 
In 1956 the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956)43 was enacted.  The Wiehahn 
Commission was established in 1979 to address various labour issues which were 
introduced by the latter Act.  The Wiehahn Commission recommended that the latter 
Act be amended.  The apartheid government accepted the recommendations of the 
Wiehahn Commission and the latter Act defined unfair labour practice as “any labour 
practice, which, in the opinion of the Industrial Court, is an unfair labour practice”. 
 
The Industrial Court, therefore, effectively fulfilled the role of the legislature, it being 
in their sole discretion to determine whether a practice constituted an unfair labour 
practice.   
 
In 1956 the Labour Relations Act44 was enacted.  The definition of “unfair labour 
practice” in this Act was amended a number of times.  By 1991 the concept of “unfair 
labour practice” was defined as: 
                                                     
37  11 of 1924. 
38  36 of 1937. 
39  Ibid. 
40  54 of 1952. 
41  36 of 1937. 
42  48 of 1953. 
43  28 of 1956. 
44  28 of 1956. 
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“[A]ny act or omission, other than a strike or lock-out which has or may have the effect 
that –  
 
(i) an employee or class of employees is or may have been unfairly affected or that 
his or their employment or work security is or may be prejudiced or jeopardized 
thereby; 
(ii) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected 
or disrupted thereby; 
(iii) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
(iv) the labour relationship between employer and employee is or may be 
detrimentally effected thereby.” 
 
Prior to the above amendment, the amendment introduced in 198845 attempted to 
codify the concept of unfair labour practice but this amendment was withdrawn after 
protest, and was substituted by the above definition in terms of Act 9 of 1991.  The 
effect of these amendments are addressed in paragraph 0 below.  
 
The legislature identified numerous employment practices constituting “unfair” 
conduct under the definition of unfair labour practice in the 1956 Labour Relations 
Act,46 including individual and collective issues, ranging from the imposition of 
disciplinary action and discrimination against individuals to bad faith bargaining.47 
 
The statutory forms of unfair labour practices can be found in section 6 of the 
Employment Equity Act48 and section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act.49   
 
2.6 THE 1988 AND 1991 AMENDMENTS TO THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT50 
 
In terms of section 1(c) of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act,51 a longer 
definition of “unfair labour practice” was introduced as the short definition was not of 
sufficient assistance to the Industrial Court in its adjudication of unfair labour practice 
disputes.  In terms of this provision, unfair labour practice was defined as: 
 
                                                     
45  Labour Relations Amendment Act 83 of 1988. 
46  28 of 1956. 
47  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 41. 
48  55 of 1998. 
49  66 of 1995. 
50  28 of 1956. 
51  95 of 1980. 
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“(a) Any labour practice or any change in any labour practice other than a strike or 
lock out.  Or any action contemplated by section 66(1) which has or may have the 
effect that: 
 
i. any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly effected, or that 
his or their employment opportunities, work security or physical, economic, 
moral or social welfare is or may be prejudiced or jeopardised whereby; 
ii. the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly 
affected or disrupted thereby; 
iii. labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
iv. the relationship between the employer and employee is or may be 
detrimentally affected thereby; 
(b)  Or any other labour practice or any other change in any labour practice which has 
or may have an effect mentioned in paragraph (a).” 
 
Decisions relating to what constitutes unfair labour practice were not subject to 
appeal until the Labour Appeal Court was created in 1998 in terms of section 17(a) of 
the Labour Relations Amendment Act.52 
 
Despite the non-appealable nature of determinations of unfair labour practice, a party 
could review such decisions/determinations at the Supreme Court (as it then was).   
 
Prior to 1988, the Industrial Court was not empowered to entertain urgent relief 
interdicting employers from committing unfair labour practices.  Since the initial 
definition of unfair labour practice53 and the amendment in terms of section 1(c) of 
the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act54 did not specify the conduct amounting to 
unfair labour practice, the legislature, by the enactment of the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act55 amended the definition of unfair labour practice.  
 
The definition in terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Act56 appears to have 
been an attempt to codify the concept of unfair labour practice. It contained thirty one 
sections and addressed sex discrimination, amongst others, highlighting the need for 
substantive and procedural fairness in dismissal cases.57  It also made provision for 
the adjudication in respect of fairness of a strike and lock-out58 and prohibited unfair 
                                                     
52  83 of 1988. 
53  S 1(e) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 94 of 1979. 
54  98 of 1980. 
55  83 of 1988. 
56  Labour Relations Amendment Act 83 of 1988. 
57  Ss 1(a)(i) - (v) and s 1(b) of Act 83 of 1988. 
58  S 1(L) of Act 83 of 1988. 
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unilateral amendments to employment agreements/terms of employment.59  These 
amendments empowered the Industrial Court to grant urgent interim relief until a final 
order was made in disputes relating to, amongst others, unfair labour practice.   
 
The 1991 amendments, in terms of section 1(a) of the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act60 again introduced the earlier definition in terms of section 1(c) of the Industrial 
Conciliation Amendment Act,61 having the effect of, amongst other things, stripping 
the Industrial Court of its powers to declare strikes unfair.  Also in terms of these 
1991 amendments, the Industrial Court was given the power to interdict illegal 
strikes.  Interim orders were done away with by section 17(D) of Act 9 of 1991, 
forcing employers to give reasonable notice of their intention to seek strike interdicts.   
 
The 1991 amendments, in terms of section 1(a) of the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act62 seem to have triggered activity by trade unions such as the COSATU and the 
National Council of Trade Unions, who campaigned against these 1991 
amendments.  The 1988 was favoured by the trade unions.  The 1991 amendments 
resulted in masses of members of these unions staying away from work. 
 
The new Labour Relations Act63 was enacted in 1995 and contained a restricted 
definition of unfair labour practice, bringing an end to the open-endedness of the 
concept of unfair labour practice.  Schedule 7 of the Labour Relations Act64 set out a 
list of “residual unfair labour practices”, which initially included unfair discrimination, 
which was later deleted and placed in the Employment Equity Act.65 
 
2.7 THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The concept of unfair labour practice arose from the recommendations of the 
Wiehahn Commission, as previously stated in this chapter, and was subsequently 
redefined a number of times in several amendments from the Labour Relations Act 
                                                     
59  S 1(D) of Act 83 of 1988.  
60  9 of 1991. 
61  95 of 1980. 
62  9 of 1991. 
63  66 of 1995. 
64  Ibid. 
65  55 of 1998. 
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28 of 1956 until the introduction of the present definition in the Labour Relations 
Act.66  
 
The right to fair labour practices was first entrenched by the interim Constitution.67  In 
addition to this provision, the interim Constitution68 also provided the following: 
 
“[t]he provisions of a law in force at the commencement of this Constitution promoting 
fair employment practices, orderly and equitable collective bargaining and the 
regulation of industrial action shall remain of full force and effect until repealed or 
amended by the legislation”. 
 
The right to be subject to fair labour practices in now entrenched in the Constitution.69  
Section 23(1) of the Constitution70 provides that “Everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices”. 
 
This section provides a guarantee to “everyone” of the right to be subjected to labour 
practices which are “fair”.  The Labour Relations Act,71 amongst other statutes, gives 
effect to this constitutional right. 
                                                     
66  Supra. 
67  S 27(1) of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, which 
provides that “every person shall have the right to fair labour practices”. 
68  S 35(5) of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
69  S 23(1) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
70  Supra. 
71  66 of 1995. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ELEMENTS OF UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In terms of the 1956 Labour Relations Act72 it was possible for an employee or trade 
union to commit an unfair labour practice.73  Under the current Labour Relations 
Act,74 unfair labour practice is confined to unfair conduct by an employer only.  Unfair 
labour practice is defined in section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act75 to mean any 
unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving: 
 
“(a)  unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation 
(excluding disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or training 
of an employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an employee; 
 
(b)  the unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short 
of dismissal in respect of an employee; 
 
(c)  a failure or refusal by an employer to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in 
terms of any agreement; and 
 
(d)  an occupational detriment other than dismissal, in contravention of the Protected 
Disclosures Act, 200076 on account of the employee having made a protected 
disclosure defined in that Act.” 
 
In terms of section 191 of the Labour Relations Act,77 an employee may refer a unfair 
labour practice dispute to the CCMA (relevant bargaining council).  An employee’s 
right not to be subjected to unfair labour practices stems from section 23 of the 
                                                     
72  28 of 1956. 
73  In the CCMA case of Maseko v Entitlement Experts [1997] 3 BLLR 317 (CCMA) the employer 
sought an award declaring an employee’s desertion of her post as bookkeeper as an unfair 
labour practice. The employer’s case was based on the assertion that the primary purpose of 
the LRA is to give effect the fundamental rights afforded by the Constitution i.e. affording 
everyone the right to fair labour practices. The CCMA commissioner stated that under the 
Labour Relations Act, 1956, that could have been an unfair labour practice in an appropriate 
situation (referring to Penrose Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Clark (1993) 14 ILJ 1558 (IC). The CCMA, 
however, handed down an award to the effect that the CCMA did not have the jurisdiction to 
arbitrate the claim. 
74  66 of 1995. 
75  Ibid. 
76  26 of 2000. 
77  66 of 1995. 
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Constitution78 (as stated in the previous chapter of this treatise at paragraph 0).  If an 
employee cannot bring himself/herself within the ambit of the Labour Relations Act,79 
the employee may approach the Labour Court directly under section 23 of the 
Constitution80 for relief and will be successful in establishing a cause of action if 
he/she can prove that the conduct complained of does, indeed, infringe on or breach 
the employees constitutional right to fair labour practices.81 
 
The following general elements must be satisfied before an employer’s conduct falls 
within the definition of unfair labour practice: 
 
3.2 “LABOUR PRACTICE”82 
 
The first part of the definition of unfair labour practice in section 186(2) of the Labour 
Relations Act83 is clear in that there must be an “act or omission” between an 
“employer and employee”. The “act or omission” of an employer must constitute a 
“labour practice”.  The Labour Relations Act84 does not contain a definition of 
“labour”.  Grogan, therefore, assumes that the word “labour” is synonymous with 
“employment”.85  This assumption is in line with that part of the definition which states 
that the act or omission must be between an employer and employee.  Therefore, an 
independent contractor or a labour broker for that matter cannot seek relief for “unfair 
labour practice” under the Labour Relations Act86 because an independent contractor 
or labour broker are not employees in the true sense of the word.  Section 200A of 
the Labour Relations Act87 sets out a presumption as to who an employee is.  The 
latter provisions states that until the contrary is proved, a person who works for, or 
renders services to, any other person is presumed, regardless of the form of the 
                                                     
78  Supra. 
79  66 of 1995. 
80  Supra. 
81  Mathews v GlaxoSmithKline SA (Pty) Ltd [2007] 3 BLLR 230 (LC), relying on NEWU v CCMA 
[2004] 2 BLLR 165 (LC). 
82  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 42-43. 
83  66 of 1995. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 42-43. 
86  66 of 1995. 
87  Ibid. 
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contract, to be an employee, if and one or more of, inter alia, the following factors are 
present: 
 
(a) The manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of 
another person; 
 
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
 
(c) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she 
works or renders services; etc. 
 
Section 186(2)(c) is an exception to the above rule.  This section allows an ex-
employee i.e.an employee who has been dismissed,88 retrenched89 or having 
resigned90 to seek relief against unfair labour practices by an erstwhile employer. 
 
In the case of Mtshali v Nestle SA,91 Nestle SA agreed with retrenched 
merchandisers that they would be afforded preference to be re-employed, if a 
vacancy arose, provided they were appropriately qualified to fulfil the said vacancy.  
The CCMA handed down an award to the effect that the refusal by Nestle SA to re-
employ the retrenched employees as packers, for which they were unqualified, was 
held not to be an unfair labour practice. 
 
In the latter CCMA case of Mtshali,92 had the retrenched employees been qualified, it 
would, in my view, fall within the ambit of section 186(2)(c) of the Labour Relations 
Act93 and would, accordingly, constitute “unfair labour practice” on the part of Nestle. 
 
                                                     
88  MEC for Tourism Environmental & Economic Affairs v Nondumo & Others Labour Court case no 
JR430/04 dated 15 April 2005, unreported – as referenced by Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination 
and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 39.  
89  Mtshali & Others v Nestle SA [2002] 6 BALR 632 (CCMA). 
90  MEC for Tourism Environmental & Economic Affairs v Nondumo & Others Labour Court case no 
JR430/04 dated 15 April 2005, unreported – as referenced by Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination 
and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 39.  
91  Mtshali & Others v Nestle SA [2002] 6 BALR 632 (CCMA). 
92  Ibid. 
93  66 of 1995. 
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Section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act94 does not protect applicants for 
employment against unfair labour practices, as no mention is made in that section to 
applicants.  However, in my view, if the applicant is an ex-employee (as in the 
Mtshali95 case) or if the applicant is an employee who is applying for another post, 
such applicant will be protected under section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act96.   
 
An employer’s conduct must amount to a “practice”.97  In the case of Marievale 
Consolidated Mines v The President of the Industrial Court98 the court considered an 
unfair labour practice dispute.  Of particular relevance, the court considered the 
meaning of the word “practice” in the context of unfair labour practice claims.  The 
court stated the following in this regard: 
 
“In my opinion, the reference to ‘labour practice’ in the definition of ‘unfair labour 
practice’ relates to a customary or recognised device, scheme or action adopted in the 
labour field. I am in no way attempting to give an exhaustive definition to that phrase. 
My purpose is solely to indicate that it does not in any way relate to habitual or 
repetitious conduct on the part of a particular employer. Such an interpretation of the 
phrase does not appear to be a natural one and is certainly not necessary having 
regard to the words and their context. It would lead to the unhappy if not absurd result 
that any employer can be a ‘bad boy’ once and may be twice but not thrice! That 
cannot have been the intention of the legislature. I can find no basis for upholding this 
submission made on behalf of the applicant.”99 
 
It follows from the above statement of the court that once-off conduct on the part of 
an employer would satisfy the existence of a “practice” in terms of section 186(2) of 
the Labour Relations Act.100  Accordingly, the conduct need not be repetitive in 
nature to qualify as a “practice”. 
 
This debate, as to whether a “practice” must be a continuous course of conduct or 
whether it can include a single act, was resolved by the use of the words “act or 
omission” in the current definition, which may refer to either a single act or single 
                                                     
94  66 of 1995.  
95  Mtshali & Others v Nestle SA [2002] 6 BALR 632 (CCMA). 
96  66 of 1995.  
97  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 39. 
98  Marievale Consolidated Mines v The President of the Industrial Court (1986) 7 ILJ 152 (T). 
99  Marievale Consolidated Mines v The President of the Industrial Court (1986) 7 ILJ 152 (T) par 
4(b). 
100  66 of 1995.  
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omission.101  Reference to the words “suspension” and “disciplinary action” in the 
definition, being once-off occurrences, conclusively resolves this debate.102 
 
3.3 “ACT OR OMISSION”103 
 
An unfair labour practice can only arise if something is done or omitted from being 
done by the employer. In other words, an employer can commit an unfair labour 
practice against an employee if it takes action or if it fails to take action in 
circumstances where it should have, which amounts to unfair labour practice 
(described in this chapter above) against the employee in question.  This 
interpretation, in my view, implies that an employer has a duty to take steps to avoid 
its employees from being subjected to unfair labour practices.  It is not sufficient for 
the employer to simply sit back and do nothing in circumstances where the employer 
identifies a potential unfair labour practice arising in respect of one or more of its 
employees.     
 
In terms the definition of “unfair labour practice”,104 the act or omission must relate to 
the conduct specified in the definition namely, inter alia, it must relate to promotion, 
probation, demotion, provision of benefits, disciplinary action, etc. 
 
3.4 “BETWEEN AN EMPLOYER AND AN EMPLOYEE” 
 
In terms of the definition of “unfair labour practice”,105 the act or omission that 
amounts to unfair labour practice is limited to parties who are in an employment 
relationship.  It does not apply to independent contractors appointed by companies.  
It applies to trade unions.  The affected party must be an employee.  Similarly a 
pension scheme cannot perpetrate an unfair labour practice unless controlled by the 
employer.106 
 
                                                     
101  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 39. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 44. 
104  S 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
105  Ibid. 
106  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2007) 44. 
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In order to constitute an unfair labour practice the act or omission must be directed 
by an employer against its own employees.107  An employer cannot commit an unfair 
labour practice against an employee of another employer. In this regard, the Labour 
Appeal Court in the case Reddy v KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and 
Culture & Others108 considered an unfair labour practice dispute relating to the failure 
of the governing body of the Department of Education and Culture (the “Department”) 
to appoint a teacher to a post which the teacher applied for.  At the arbitration, an 
award was handed down to the effect that the Department was responsible for the 
conduct of the governing body.  The Labour Appeal Court rejected the teacher’s 
contention that the perpetrator of an unfair labour practice against an employee need 
not necessarily be an employer of that employee.  The Labour Appeal Court held that 
unfair labour practices could only be perpetrated by parties to an employment 
relationship. 
 
The phrase “that arises between an employer and an employee” suggests that unfair 
labour practices can be committed by either the employer or employee.109  Whilst it 
was possible in terms of the 1956 Labour Relations Act,110 for employees to commit 
an unfair labour practice against his or her employer, in terms of the wording of 
current definition111 of unfair labour practice clearly indicates that unfair labour 
practices can only be perpetrated by employers.  This is apparent by the use of the 
following phrases in the definition namely: 
 
“unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion …”; 
(3) “the unfair suspension of an employee…”; and 
(4) “a failure or refusal by an employer to reinstate or re-employ a former 
employee…; etc” 
 
3.5 “INVOLVING”112  
 
The conduct must comprise of or “involve” one of the following practices, namely: 
                                                     
107  Reddy v KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and Culture & Others [2003] 7 BLLR 661 
(LAC). 
108  Supra. 
109  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 40. 
110  28 of 1956. 
111  S 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
112  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 40. 
  19 
 
(1) promotion; 
(2) demotion; 
(3) probation; 
(4) the provision of benefits; 
(5) suspension; 
(6) disciplinary action short of dismissal; 
(7) failure to reinstate or re-employ in terms of an agreement; or 
(8) an occupational detriment.  
 
Therefore, a transfer (that does not result in a demotion), for example, will not 
properly fall within the ambit of the definition of “unfair labour practice” in terms of 
section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act113 if it does not comprise of one of the 
above practices.  Similarly, a dispute concerning an employer’s failure to re-instate or 
re-employ an employee must be in terms of an underlying agreement to qualify as an 
“unfair labour practice” under the current definition. 
 
3.6 “UNFAIR CONDUCT” 
 
The conduct must be patently unfair, i.e. the act or omission must involve, for 
example, unfair demotion, unfair suspension or unfair disciplinary action. 
 
The Labour Relations Act does not contain a definition of “unfair”. According to a 
number of dictionaries, it means “not fair”, “unjust”, “inequitable”, etc.  “Unfair” in the 
context of unfair labour practice, introduces an equitable element into the area of law 
covered by the definition. 
 
In the case of the Department of Justice v CCMA and Others,114 the Labour Court 
considered a dispute relating to the failure of an employer to appoint employees to 
higher posts.  The Labour Court considered an award of a CCMA commissioner i.e. 
in making an award to the effect that the dispute concerned alleged unfair conduct 
relating to promotion, and that the decision not to promote the employees amounted 
                                                     
113  66 of 1995. 
114  Department of Justice v CCMA and Others [2001] 11 BLLR 1229 (LC). 
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to an unfair labour practice by the employer.  The Labour Court noted that in addition 
to the grounds of review laid down in the Labour Relations Act,115 awards can also be 
reviewed if the conclusions reached therein are not rationally connected to the 
evidence that was placed before the arbitrator. In other words, the grounds for review 
are not limited to procedural defects but to substantive grounds as well. It follows that 
“unfair conduct” must be procedurally and/or substantively unfair. 
  
                                                     
115  66 of 1995. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BENEFITS 
 
 
4.1 WHAT ARE “BENEFITS”? 
 
The concept “benefits” is not defined in the Labour Relations Act.116  The literal, 
dictionary117 meaning, of “benefit” is as follows: 
 
“…a helpful or good effect, or something intended to help…” 
 
A number of cases (which are dealt with in more detail later in this chapter) focused 
primarily on whether, amongst other things, a dispute falls within the ambit of section 
186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act.118  One particular issue related to whether 
employees have the right to strike in respect of such a dispute or would have to 
resort to arbitration, or whether both these remedies remained available.  Other 
important issues related to the meaning of the word “benefits”119 and whether 
remuneration falls within the ambit of the concept of “benefits”. 
 
4.2 INTERPRETATION OF “BENEFITS” BY THE CCMA 
 
Does remuneration fall within the definition of benefits under section 186(2)(a)?  
Traditionally, the CCMA gave a wide meaning to the term “benefits”, which included 
the laying of free transport, deductions of amounts from the remuneration of 
employees and where employees were given the option of a reduction of salary or 
termination of employment.120 
 
The CCMA and our labour courts have extensively grappled with the meaning of the 
term “benefits”.  The subject of a number of cases dealt with whether a dispute falls 
                                                     
116  66 of 1995. 
117  Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 3rd ed (2008). 
118  66 of 1995. 
119  Basson, Christianson, Dekker, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke, Strydom Essential Labour Law 5th 
ed (2009) 202. 
120  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 204. 
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within the ambit of section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act.121   In many 
instances the labour courts and CCMA are called to consider whether employees 
have the right to strike in respect of a dispute or whether they would have to resort to 
arbitration, alternatively, whether both these remedies remained available to 
employees. Another key subject in such cases related to the meaning of the word 
“benefits”122.  
 
Section 65(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act123 provides that employees may not 
strike over issues that may be referred to arbitration in terms of the Labour Relations 
Act.124  A dispute over benefits, it being a “rights dispute”, may be referred to 
arbitration.  If benefits are considered to include remuneration, would this mean that 
employees may not strike over wages and salaries in section 65(1)(c) of the Labour 
Relations Act?125  According to Van Jaarsveld126 a widest possible meaning should 
be attached to the concept “benefits” when read with the purpose of the Labour 
Relations Act127 and a restricted interpretation should be given to the term 
“remuneration”.  The term “benefits” constitutes a non-wage or non-salary benefit.  It 
is does not incorporate remuneration.  Examples of benefits (in the context of 
remuneration) include allowances,128 provident funds,129 pension entitlements,130 car 
allowances131 and medical aid contributions by the employer.132 
 
In the case of South African Catering and Clothing Allied Workers Union 
(SACCAWU) v Garden Route Chalets Pty Ltd,133 the CCMA equated “benefit” with 
“pay” which included any consideration accruing to an employee by virtue of the 
employment relationship, including concessionary travel facilities and ex gratia 
                                                     
121  66 of 1995. 
122  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 202. 
123  66 of 1995. 
124  Ibid. 
125  Ibid. 
126  Van Jaarsveld Principles and Practice of Labour Law (2001) par 784-785. 
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payments.  The commissioner relied on a British case of Garland v British Railways 
Board.134  That court held that even payments made ex gratia by an employer fall 
within the concept of a benefit, provided that they are granted in respect of the 
employment.  The commissioner in the SACCAWU135 matter, therefore, held that the 
laying on of free transport constitutes a benefit in terms of item 2(1)(b) irrespective of 
whether it is granted in terms of a contract ex gratia to suit the needs of the 
employer.  Based on this wide approach, the employer’s conduct was held to be 
unfair. 
 
Later decisions of both the CCMA (and the Labour Court) favoured a narrower 
interpretation of the term “benefits” so as to exclude all payments that could be 
interpreted as falling under a broad scope of remuneration.   
 
In AUBTW v Lumber Laminator (Edms) Bpk136 the CCMA held that it did not appear 
that the legislature intended to exclude remuneration when it referred to benefits 
under the unfair labour practice definition.  The commissioner, therefore, ruled that it 
had jurisdiction to hear the matter of mutual interest where the employee’s salaries 
were reduced by the employer.  Whilst the commissioner came to the correct 
conclusion that the employer’s conduct was not unfair, in my view, the CCMA had no 
jurisdiction to hear the case since it constituted dispute of interest, in respect of which 
industrial strike action would be the appropriate remedy.   
 
In the case of Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) v Enterprise Bakery137 the 
CCMA considered a dispute involving the question as to whether the employer 
should pay certain employees overtime and commission.  The commissioner held 
that the CCMA lacked the necessary jurisdiction to decide a dispute involving 
commission and overtime pay in terms of the residual unfair labour practice.  The 
commissioner based his decision on the fact that the dispute fell within the 
                                                     
134  1982 ECR 359. 
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jurisdiction of the Department of Labour in terms of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act.138  In this regard the commissioner stated as follows:  
 
“As to overtime, FAWU referred the matter to arbitration and the company raised no 
objection as to the CCMA’s jurisdiction. I am however not convinced that the issue falls 
to be decided by the CCMA under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. I do not think 
that parties should be able to refer disputes that should be attended to by the 
Department of Labour to the CCMA under the guise of ‘unfair labour practice’. The 
drivers may have a statutory right to overtime in terms of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 137 of 1993. If the drivers are ‘travellers’ they are not entitled to 
overtime in terms of that Act. The CCMA is not the appropriate form to determine this 
and the aggrieved party should pursue its claim at the Department of Labour. The 
CCMA has no jurisdiction to enforce the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the 
statute provides (at section 30) criminal sanction for breach and the CCMA has no 
criminal jurisdiction. Whilst the conduct of the employer may well be a breach or in 
contravention of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act it is not “unfair conduct” in 
terms of schedule 7.” 
 
Below I deal with the relevant Labour Courts’ decisions in relation to the 
interpretation of “benefits”.  
 
4.3 INTERPRETATION OF “BENEFITS” BY THE LABOUR COURTS 
 
Schoeman v Samsung Electronic SA (Pty) Ltd139 was one of the first cases where the 
Labour Court was called to consider a dispute involving benefits.  
 
In the Labour Court case of Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd,140 the 
Labour Court was required to consider a dispute involving benefits.  In this case, 
Schoeman was appointed as a sales executive on a basic salary with a car 
allowance.  Her employment contract was silent on commission.  She refused to 
accept a reduction in her sales commission.  As a result, her employer implemented 
a “lock-out”, prohibiting her from returning to work.  Schoeman sought an order 
declaring the lock-out to be illegal, and that her salary package and her reduced 
commission be restored. 
 
The court held that, since a lock-out could not be effective against a single employee, 
the employer's conduct constituted a breach of the employment contract.  The court 
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held further that the sales commission was not a benefit as contemplated by item 
2(1)(b) of the residual unfair labour practice definition.141  It held further that: 
 
(1) the commission formed part of Schoeman's salary and that it was a quid pro 
quo for services rendered, like a salary; 
 
(2) remuneration is, therefore, part of the basic conditions of employment; 
 
(3) remuneration is different to benefits; 
 
(4) a benefit are something extra, apart from remuneration; 
 
(5) often it (a benefit) is a term and condition of an employment contract and often 
not; and 
 
(6) remuneration is always a term of an employment contact. 
 
The Labour Court went as far as seeking assistance from the dictionary.142  The 
Labour Court excluded remuneration from the concept of benefits on the basis that it 
is not listed as an unfair labour practice and that it could not have been the intention 
of the legislature for remuneration to be included in this definition.  
 
In my view, this reasoning follows the literal approach of interpretation and ignores 
the interpretation provisions of the Labour Relations Act143 (section 3).  It was very 
clearly and, in my view, correctly stated in the case of Aviation Union of South Africa 
v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd,144 where the Constitutional Court held that section 
3 of the Labour Relations Act145 is the starting point and mandates an interpretation 
                                                     
141  The definition of “unfair labour practice” was later inserted into the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 
1995 (s 186(2)). This had the effect of the unfair discrimination no longer being part of the 
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143  66 of 1995. 
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which complies with the Constitution146 and public international law whilst giving 
effect to the primary objects of the Labour Relations Act.147  Section 186(2)(a) of the 
Labour Relations Act148 gives effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution which 
provides for the right to fair labour practices.  The term benefit must, therefore, be 
accorded an interpretation that gives effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution.149  In 
NEHAWU v University of Cape Town150 the Constitutional Court held that section 
23(1) is not defined in the Constitution151 and is incapable of precise decision.  The 
court further stated that the Labour Courts are responsible for the interpretation of the 
Labour relations Act,152 which was enacted to give effect to section 23(1) of the 
Constitution,153 and should seek guidance from domestic and international 
experience in this regard.  It stated that international experience is reflected in both 
the Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation as 
well as related foreign instruments.154  There are examples of international treaties 
that defines “remuneration”155 and “pay”156 very broadly so as to include benefits in 
“remuneration”.  In my view, benefits are not excluded from “remuneration”. 
 
The next Labour Court case, following Schoeman,157 where the Labour Court was 
considered a dispute involving benefits, was Gaylord v Telkom South Africa Ltd.158  
The Labour Court considered a dispute involving accumulated leave pay, 
characterising this issue as a contractual dispute.  As regards the interpretation and 
application of item 2(1)(b), the court re-affirmed its position taken in the Schoeman 
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case, linking a dispute regarding the non-payment of accumulated leave to 
remuneration and the judge stated as follows:   
 
“If the term benefit is so generously interpreted so as to include any advantage 
or right in terms of the employment contract, even wages, item 2(1)(b) would all 
but preclude strikes and lockouts.  This was plainly not what the legislature had 
in mind.  Therefore, wages and salaries, in other words, remuneration, should 
be excluded from the term benefit.  In the same vein, accumulated leave pay 
should also be excluded as it is nothing more than remuneration based on the 
contract between the parties.”   
 
The Labour Court in the case of Sithole v Nogwaza NO159 held as follows:   
 
“Although opinion as to what constitutes a benefit (as opposed to remuneration) differ, 
the common thread running through all the decisions and the academic writings is that 
a ‘benefit’ constitutes a material benefit such as pensions, medical aid, housing 
subsidies, insurance, social security or membership of a club or society.  In other words 
the benefit must have some monetary value for the recipient and be a cost to the 
employer.  It is also something which arises out of a contract of employment.”   
 
In the Sithole case the Labour Court held that the beneficiary must have received a 
benefit of monetary value at the expense of the employer.   
 
In the case of Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO160 the Labour 
Court also held that a benefit is a supplementary advantage conferred on our 
employee for which no work is required.  The court referred to section 213 of the 
Labour Relations Act161 where it defines “remuneration” to mean “any payment on 
money or in kind, or both in money and in kind, made or owing to any person in 
return for that person working for any other person, including the State, and 
(remunerate” has a corresponding meaning”.  The court concluded that, 
“remuneration” is an essentialia of the contract of employment and other rights or 
benefits accruing to an employee by agreement are termed naturalia.  Further, a 
benefit forms part of the naturalia and not essentialia.162  The court found that a claim 
for higher salary did not constituted a benefit and that the word “benefit” in item 
2(1)(b) means, at least, a non-wage benefit.  In this regard the court referred to the 
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Schoeman163 decision where Relevas J stated that “Remuneration is different from 
‘benefits’.  A benefit is something extra, apart from remuneration.  Often it is a term 
and condition of an employment contract and often not.  Remuneration is always a 
term and condition of the employment contract”. 
 
In the case of Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers164 the Labour Court 
held that disputes of right concern the application or interpretation of existing rights.  
Disputes of interest relate to proposals for the creation of new rights or the diminution 
of existing rights.  Disputes of interest are ordinarily resolved through collective 
bargaining.  Such disputes were defined in the Public Service Labour Relations 
Act165 as “matters of mutual interest” and are considered to mean, inter alia, matters 
relating to terms and conditions of employment, compensation, remuneration and 
service benefits.  This Act, before it was repealed, did not permit any disputes other 
than a dispute of right to be submitted to the Industrial Court. 
 
In the Scheepers case the respondents were all hospital workers holding posts of 
administration clerks.  They were required to perform tasks ordinarily performed by 
incumbents of a higher occupational class i.e. higher than that of an administration 
clerk.  The Industrial Court held that their employment in such work without extra 
remuneration constituted an unfair labour practice.  On appeal to the Labour Appeal 
Court, the court held that it was not the intention of the legislature to create a further 
source of rights under the general unfair labour practice definition of the 1956 Labour 
Relations Act.166  The court also held that the dispute was one that should be 
resolved through a collective bargaining process.   
 
In the case of Horspersa v Northern Cape Provincial Administration167 the court 
considered whether the second appellant, who had been acting in a more senior 
position than her normal post, was entitled to be paid an acting allowance.  The 
Labour Court held that the term “benefits” only includes benefits ex contractu and ex 
lege benefits that already exist.  The court declared that the acting allowance dispute 
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was one of interest and not a rights dispute.  The court differentiated between 
disputes of interest and of rights in the following extract from the judgement:   
 
“Broadly speaking, disputes of right concern the infringement, application or 
interpretation of existing rights embodied in a contract of employment, while disputes 
of interest (or economic disputes) concern the creation of fresh rights, such as higher 
wages, modification of existing collective grants etc.”   
 
It is clear from the judgment in Hospersa168 that disputes about the application of pre-
existing policies or rights to leave or the right to an acting allowance or a transport 
allowance, is a dispute of right and would fall within the ambit of the term “benefit”.  If 
the dispute relates to the creation of a new right (i.e. a dispute of interest) it will not 
constitute a benefit and the parties may pursue industrial actions of strike or lock-out 
in respect thereof.   
 
My view favours the Hospersa169 decision. It seems to be useful and a good guide to 
determine what a benefit entails.  It is clear that if the dispute concerns a pre-existing 
policy or right then it constitutes a dispute of right.  According to Hospersa,170 the 
“benefits” in the definition of unfair labour practice only include pre-existing benefits 
ex contractu and ex lege.  The effect of this case is that section 186(2)(a) of the 
Labour Relations Act171 should be used to enforce existing contractual, statutory and 
common law rights in relation to benefits. 
 
4.4 DISPUTES OF INTEREST VS DISPUTES OF RIGHT 
 
As it can be seen in the cases discussed in paragraph 0 above, our courts have, over 
the years, arrived at conflicting decisions on the issue of whether an employee must 
first establish a contractual right or a right in law before it would constitute an unfair 
labour practice.  
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Traditionally, a broad distinction between these two disputes needs to be considered 
when considering a labour dispute resolution mechanism.  Whilst South African 
labour legislation does not traditionally recognise the distinction between dispute of 
interest and a dispute of right it typically forms the basis of dispute resolution in the 
labour arena. 
 
A dispute of interest is a dispute concerning the creation of new rights.  A dispute of 
interest is where employees seek to further their interest where there are no existing 
rights in relation to the interest.  For example, disputes of interest are disputes 
relating to higher wages where employees do not have a clear right thereto. In this 
instance, employees would have to negotiate with their employer or demand that the 
employer increase their wages.  Our South African labour legislation does not 
prescribe the outcome of a dispute of interest but does regulate disputes about 
matters of mutual interest and the bargaining process in relation thereto.  
 
In this regard, section 134 of the Labour Relations Act172 governs disputes about 
mattes of mutual interest and provides that a party to a dispute about a matter of 
mutual interest may refer the dispute in writing to the CCMA if the parties are, on the 
one side, one or more trade unions and/or employees and, on the other side, one or 
more employers’ organisations and/or employers.  
 
In regard to the bargaining process, Chapter 3 of the Labour Relations Act173 
regulates the collective bargaining process. In particular, section 21 regulates the 
process that must be followed in relation to the conclusion of a collective agreement.  
Section 21(4) states that if, after the require notice is sent by a trade union to and 
employer and after a meeting is held, the parties are not able to conclude a collective 
agreement, then either party may refer the dispute in writing to the CCMA. 
 
A dispute of right is a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of a right 
that already exists either in the employment contract or by operation of law.  It is a 
dispute where employees or employers do not wish to create new rights, as in the 
case of a dispute of interest, but the parties instead seek to enforce pre-existing right.  
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For example, disputes of right can be about whether an employee was unfairly 
dismissed.  The employee has an entrenched right in terms of section 185 the 
Labour Relations Act174 not to be unfairly dismissed. In this regard section 185 
states, amongst other things, that every employee has a right not to be subjected to 
unfair labour practices. 
 
Disputes of interest must be resolved through a process of collective bargaining, in 
which case employees are permitted to embark on industrial actions such as strikes 
and employers may pursue lock-outs.  Disputes of right must be resolved through a 
process of arbitration or adjudication.  
 
Unfair labour practices concerning benefits cannot be interest disputes.  In this 
regard (as discussed paragraph 4.3 above) the Labour Court held that the term 
“benefits” only includes benefits ex contractu and ex lege benefits that already 
exist.175  In other words, benefits of employees arise pursuant to existing rights in 
terms of a contract or in terms of legislation and, accordingly, does not constitute an 
interest.  For this reason, an unfair labour practice concerning benefits cannot 
constitute a dispute of interest, but it is rather a dispute of right. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT JUDGMENT OF APOLLO TYRES v 
CCMA176 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The court in the Apollo177 case was tasked with the duty to consider whether an 
employee, who alleges that the employer committed an unfair labour practice in 
relation to the provision of benefits, will only have a remedy if such employee can 
prove that he/she has a right or entitlement to contractually agreed benefits (ex 
contractus) or common law benefits (ex lege). 
 
Hoosen (the third respondent) was employed by Apollo Tyres South Africa (the 
appellant) since 1 April 1984.  The appellant decided to initiate an early retirement 
scheme for a number of its employees (but not all of its employees) in 2008.  
According to a notice placed on the notice board at the appellant’s premises, the 
retirement scheme only applied to monthly paid staff between the ages of 46 and 59 
years old.  
 
In terms of the retirement scheme any successful applicant would receive two 
months’ additional pay and an ex-gratia payment which was calculated on a sliding 
scale based on the age of the applicants.  In addition, normal retirement benefits 
would be applicable.  Entry into the scheme was subject to the appellant’s 
managements’ discretion.  
 
After Hoosen had applied for entry into the retirement scheme, the financial director 
exercised his discretion and refused Hoosen entry into the scheme.  Hoosen, who 
was 49 years old, requested reasons for the refusal of the application but was 
referred to the Human Resource Department.  Neither the financial director nor her 
direct senior advised her that she had to be between the age of 55 and 59 years to 
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qualify for the scheme.  She was eventually advised that there was nothing she could 
do if she had been refused entry into the scheme. 
 
Hoosen resigned and during the course of her notice period she referred the refusal 
into the retirement scheme as an unfair labour practice dispute to the CCMA.  The 
CCMA found that the appellant had committed an unfair labour practice concerning 
benefits and the Appellant took the award on review but was unsuccessful.  The 
subsequent application by the appellant for leave to appeal was refused.  However, 
leave to appeal was granted by the Labour Appeal Court.  
 
The management of the appellant confirmed that, after Hoosen had resigned, her 
functions were delegated to other employees.  Furthermore, it confirmed that two 
other employees who were younger than 55 years old had been allowed into the 
retirement scheme due to ill health. 
 
At the CCMA the Appellant had raised two points.  Firstly, it argued that the CCMA 
lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate because there was no employment relationship at the 
time of referral of the dispute to it.  This argument was rejected on the basis of the’ 
judgment of the Labour Court in the case of Venlinov v University of Kwazulu-Natal178 
where the court held that the CCMA only has jurisdiction in respect of a dispute that 
has arisen in the context of an employment relationship.  
 
The second point raised by the appellant, was that the early retirement package 
initiated in the retirement scheme was not a benefit in respect of which the CCMA 
has jurisdiction and that it had not been unfair to deny Hoosen the early retirement 
package.  
 
Referring to the judgments in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA179 and Department of 
Justice v CCMA and Others180 the CCMA ruled that it had jurisdiction to arbitrate the 
dispute.  In respect of the issue of fairness raised by the appellant, the CCMA found 
that it was unfair to deny Hoosen entry into the scheme.   
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On review to the Labour Court, the appellant argued that the CCMA had determined 
the jurisdiction issue incorrectly.  The appellant also argued that Hoosen was 
disqualified in participating in the scheme by reason of her resignation.  The 
Appellant also took issue with the CCMA’s decision not to allow a postponement to 
call a witness of the appellant to testify, submitting that it was unfair. It was also 
contended that the refusal to allow Hoosen to participate in the scheme was not 
unfair. 
 
The Labour Court rejected the appellants’ arguments and dismissed the application.  
The Labour Court, held, that the CCMA’s finding i.e. that the scheme was a benefit 
that falls within the ambit of section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act,181 is a 
decision that fell within the band of reasonableness.  The Labour Court further stated 
that the “debate about which of the decisions of this court is (sic) correct or is to be 
preferred on what constitutes benefits as is embarked upon by the applicant belongs 
to an appeal and not a review”.  On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court pointed out that 
the Labour Court (a quo) seemed to have misinterpreted the appellants’ argument in 
entertaining the question as to whether the CCMA acted reasonably in reaching its 
decision, which is incorrect.  In this regard, the Labour Appeal Court stated that the 
argument was, in fact, whether the CCMA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute 
because the scheme (on the Appellant’s’ argument) is not a benefit falling under 
section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act.182  The Labour Appeal Court stated 
further that “the question is therefore not whether the second respondent acted 
reasonably or reached a conclusion that a reasonable commissioner could not reach 
but whether his finding is wrong or right.  Put differently the enquiry ought to be 
whether the second respondent was correct in ruling that the CCMA had jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the dispute”.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo183 referred to the judgment in City of Cape Town v 
SAMWU obo Jacobs and Others184 where the appellant (in that case) was of the view 
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that the true question is whether the cause of action was a good one or not 
depending primarily, on whether the early retirement package constituted a benefit.  
The Labour Appeal Court stated that even on this construction the reasonableness 
test would not be applicable. 
 
5.2 THE MEANING OF “BENEFIT” EXAMINED BY THE LABOUR APPEAL 
COURT IN APOLLO TYRES185  
 
In terms of section 186(2)(a) an unfair labour practice is defined to mean any unfair 
act or omission that arise between an employer and an employee involving, inter alia, 
“the provision of benefits to an employee”.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court examined several judgements in determining the meaning 
of “benefit” in section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act:186 
 
The first case considered was Schoeman and Another v Samsung Electronics SA 
Pty Ltd.187  In this case the Court considered the definition of “benefit” which is 
defined as an “advantage or an allowance to which a person is entitled to under 
insurance or social security …”.188 
 
The court concluded that commission payable to an employee forms part of the 
employee’s salary as it was for services rendered.  Benefits, unlike remuneration, are 
something extra and not the same as remuneration i.e. in addition to the basic terms 
and conditions of employment.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court also referred to Northern Cape Provincial Administration v 
Commissioner Hambidge NO.189  In this matter the Court found that remuneration 
was an essential of a contract of employment i.e. essentialia and that other rights, 
advantages or benefits accruing to an employee by agreement are termed naturalia 
(to distinguish them from essentialia of an employment contract).  
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In Sithole v Nogwaza and Others,190 the court endorsed the decision in Northern 
Cape Provincial Administration v Commissioner Hambidge NO and Others191 but 
stated further that a benefit must have a monetary value being a cost to the 
employer.  Furthermore, the Court held that a benefit must arise out of a contract of 
employment.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo Tyres recognised that the decisions in the above 
cases were influenced by policy considerations in order to keep the decisions over 
disputes over rights and disputes of interests in separate categories.  The Labour 
Appeal Court noted that this categorisation gave meaning to section 65(1)(c) of the 
Labour Relations Act192 in that this section proscribes industrial action in respect of 
disputes over rights.  
 
Section 65(1)(c) provides that no person may take part in a strike or lock-out or in any 
conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock-out if the issue in dispute is 
one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or in the Labour Court.  
 
With reference to the Labour Court’s decision in Gaylord v Telkom SA Ltd,193 the 
court stated that whilst disputes in respect of remuneration would be a term in the 
employment contract, remuneration should be excluded from the term “benefits”.  
The Labour Appeal Court’s reasoning to this interpretation is that “benefits” should 
not be widely interpreted so as to undermine the Constitutional right to strike.194  
 
“Remuneration” is defined in section 213 in the Labour Relations Act195 as follows:  
 
“Remuneration means any payment in money or in kind made or owing to any person 
in return for that person working for any other person, including the State, and 
remunerate as a corresponding meaning.” 
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The Labour Appeal Court, with reference to the author Le Roux,196 recognises that 
many “extras” or “benefits” form part of the essentialia of most employment contracts 
these days, particularly since remuneration packages are often structured in a tax 
efficient way.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others197 accordingly 
held that, in order to decide whether a dispute must be settled by way of industrial 
action or adjudication, one must look at the nature of the benefit dispute.  The reason 
for this is because benefit disputes may fall into two categories, namely: 
 
(1) Where a dispute concerns a demand that a benefit be granted or reinstated 
irrespective of whether the employer was fair in making a decision.  Such a 
dispute may be subjected to industrial action;  
 
(2) where a dispute concerns the fairness of an employer’s conduct.  Such a 
dispute may be adjudicated by way of arbitration in the CCMA or referred to the 
Labour Court.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo Tyres agreed with the above assessment of the 
court in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others.198  The Labour Appeal Court also 
stated that this reasoning (above) supports the appellant’s argument that a wide 
construction of the term “benefit” would delineate some items of remuneration as 
benefits thereby sacrificing clarity.  
 
5.3 THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT’S EXAMINATION OF WHETHER A 
DUPLICATION OF REMEDIES EXIST? 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo Tyres199 examined the cases which follow in this 
paragraph in determining whether an employee may embark upon an industrial 
action and adjudication simultaneously in respect of the same disputes. 
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In the case of Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others,200 the court stated that whilst 
employees, in disputes over benefits, may elect to embark upon industrial action as 
opposed to adjudication (where the fairness of the employer is in question) the 
Labour Relations Act201 does not seem to preclude employees from embarking on 
both remedies simultaneously.  
 
In the case of Maritime Industries Trade Union of SA and Others v Transnet Ltd and 
Others,202 the Labour Appeal Court in this case took a contrary approach to the court 
in Protekon.203  It stated that if a dispute about a unilateral change of conditions of 
employment can properly be subjected to industrial action, it will nevertheless be 
arbitrable, because these two categories of disputes do not necessarily divide into 
watertight compartments.  However, the Labour Relations Act204 contemplates a 
separation of disputes into those that are resolved in arbitration, through adjudication 
and through industrial action, and provides a choice of remedy to employees.  
 
In the case of Monyela and Others v Bruce Jacobs t/a LV Construction,205 the court 
stated that a unilateral change of the terms and conditions of employment is a right 
dispute and is subject to industrial action under the Labour Relations Act206 because 
it does not fall under the provisions of section 65(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act.  
Therefore, whilst the Labour Relations Act207 seem to allow both remedies to the 
employee, i.e. industrial action and adjudication, viewing this Act holistically makes it 
clear that the intention was to give employees an election as to the remedy.  
 
The appellant’s argument was that an employee may not rely on section 186(2)(a) of 
the Labour Relations Act208 to create a right that does not exist and that this section 
is intended to afford recourse in cases of unfair conduct in respect of an existing 
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right.  The appellant’s submission is supported by the court in Hospersa209 in that it 
respects a clear divide between disputes of rights and disputes of interests and 
avoids the situation where new rights may be created by recourse to unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction and a duplication of remedies.  
 
Hoosen’s representative’s argument was that the intention of section 186(2)(a) to 
“come to the rescue of employees such as Hoosen who have no other remedy in the 
Labour Relations Act210 or the Common Law”.  Furthermore, if the term benefit is to 
be construed widely, i.e. encompassing more than mere contractual entitlements, it 
would support the purpose and effect of the residual unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction.  Hoosen did not agree with the decision in Hospersa.211  
 
In Hospersa,212 the court was of the opinion that it was not the legislature’s intention 
to seek to facilitate the creation of an entitlement to a benefit which an employee 
does not otherwise have.  To the contrary, the legislature sought to bring under the 
residual unfair labour practice jurisdiction benefits disputes which an employee is 
entitled ex contractu (contractually) or ex lege (in terms of legislation).  
 
The court in Hospersa213 went further to state that a dispute of interest should be 
dealt with under the umbrella of collective bargaining and is not arbitrable.  
Furthermore, a dispute of interest should not be allowed to be arbitrated under the 
pretext that it is a dispute of right.  If employees are able to secure orders that have 
the effect of determining the evaluation of differing interests on the merits, then the 
distinction between disputes of interest and disputes of right would be distorted, 
causing the collective bargaining process to be undermined.  In summarising the 
distinction between disputes of interest and disputes of right, and the procedure to be 
followed in their resolution, the court quoted an extract from Rycroft and Jordaan:214 
 
“Broadly speaking, disputes of right concern the infringement, application or 
interpretation of existing rights embodied in a contract of employment, collective 
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agreement or statute, while disputes of interest (or ‘economic disputes’) concern the 
creation of fresh rights, such as higher wages, modification of existing collective 
agreements, etc.  Collective bargaining, mediation and, as a last resort, peaceful 
industrial action, are generally regarded as the most appropriate avenues for the 
settlement of conflicts of interest, while adjudication is normally regarded as an 
appropriate method of resolving disputes of right.” 
 
Hospersa215 has been followed in numerous judgements in the Labour Appeal Court 
including in the case of Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers & Others.216  
In this case, the court recognised that the unfair labour practice dispensation does, in 
fact, create rights.  In this regard it stated that unfair labour practice involved 
infringement of a right, that the right was judicially created pursuant to the powers 
given to the Industrial Court by statute, and not by contract or legislation, did not 
make it less of a right.  This was a significant shift from the decision in Hospersa217, 
where the court held that the right to a benefit must originate from statute, contract or 
a collective agreement.  
 
In GS 4 Security Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Nasgawu and Others,218 after the 
Department of Justice v CCMA and Others219 matter, the approach in Hospersa220 
was unconditionally accepted.  In this case, the court held that in order for the 
employees to bring a successful claim under item 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7, they would 
have to demonstrate an existing right arising ex lege or ex contractu whereafter the 
Commissioner would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute as a dispute of right.  
The court, however, did not take into cognisance of the majority and minority 
judgments in the case of the Department of Justice v CCMA and Others221 matter, or 
the decision in Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers and Others,222 which 
the Labour Appeal Court in the Apollo case criticised negatively.  The court in GS 4 
Security Services did not consider the following: 
 
                                                     
215  Hospersa & Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (1999) 20 ILJ 1910 (LC). 
216  [2000] 7 BLLR 756 (LAC) par 6.  
217  Hospersa & Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (1999) 20 ILJ 1910 (LC). 
218  Unreported judgment case number DA3/08 (LAC). 
219  [2004] 4 BLLR 297 (LAC). 
220  Hospersa & Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (1999) 20 ILJ 1910 (LC). 
221  [2004] 4 BLLR 297 (LAC). 
222  [2000] 7 BLLR 756 (LAC). 
  41 
(1) Item 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7 creates a right not to be treated unfairly in relation to 
promotion, demotion, disciplinary action short of dismissal, training and the 
provision of benefits; and 
(2) The unfair labour practice dispensation created rights. 
 
In the Department of Justice v CCMA and Others223 the court held that the obligation 
that item 2(1)(a) places on an employer is an obligation not to act unfairly towards an 
employee and an applicant for employment by way of conduct constituting unfair 
discrimination.  The obligation in item 2(1)(b) which is placed on an employer, is not 
to act unfairly towards an existing employee in relation to promotion, demotion, 
disciplinary action short of dismissal, training and benefits.  The rights under items 
2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) are conferred on employees ex lege.  Therefore, a dispute 
concerning whether the conduct of an employer relating to promotion is an unfair 
labour practice is a dispute of right not interest.  
 
5.4 DECISION OF LABOUR APPEAL COURT IN APOLLO224  
 
The Labour Appeal Court followed the reasoning in the majority and minority 
judgement in the case of Scheepers, i.e. that the unfair labour practice dispensation 
creates rights and that an employee has an ex lege right created by section 186(2)(a) 
not to be treated unfairly in relation to promotion, demotion, training and the provision 
of benefits.  
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to fair labour 
practice.  The concept of unfair labour practice must be given content by the 
legislature and thereafter given meaning by the decisions of specialist tribunals 
including the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court.225 
 
The Labour Appeal Court endorsed the assertion in Hospersa226 that the source of a 
benefit must be found to exist ex contractu or ex lege.  The Labour Appeal Court 
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agreed with the appellant’s argument that the Department of Justice matter still begs 
the question as to whether a benefit is confined to a contractual benefit or not.  
 
In terms of the minority judgment in the Department of Justice case, the assertion in 
Hospersa227 that the entitlement to a benefit must be grounded in contract or 
legislation is incorrect.  The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo agreed with this decision. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court agreed with the decision in Hospersa228 as to the view that 
the unfair labour practice jurisdiction cannot be used to assert an entitlement to new 
benefits, to new forms of remuneration or to new policies not provided for by the 
employer.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court agreed with the decision in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v Others, in 
that the court in Protekon: 
 
(a) did not agree that an employee may have recourse to the CCMA’s unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction only in circumstances in which he/ she has a cause of 
action in law; 
 
(b) there are many employer and employee rights and obligations in many 
employee benefits schemes; 
 
(c) section 186(2)(a) regulates employer conduct by super imposing a duty of 
fairness irrespective of whether a duty exists expressly or implicitly in the 
contractual provisions that establishes the benefit; 
 
(d) the existence of an employer’s discretion does not deprive the CCMA of 
jurisdiction in relation to a dispute involving an employer’s conduct in terms of 
section 186(2)(a); 
 
(e) section 186(2)(a) was introduced primarily to permit scrutiny of employer 
discretion in the context of employee benefits; and 
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(f) there are at least two instances of employer conduct relating to the provision of 
benefits that may be subjected to scrutiny by the CCMA under its unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction, namely: 
(i) where the employer fails to comply with the contractual obligation that it 
has towards an employee (which is in line with the Hospersa229 approach); 
and 
 
(ii) where the employer exercises a discretion that it has under the contractual 
terms of the scheme conferring a benefit.  In this regard the Labour Appeal 
Court in Apollo was of the view that the words “contractual terms” was 
used loosely, i.e. it did not mean that the source of the discretion must be 
found in contract but rather when the employer exercises a discretion 
under the terms of the scheme conferring the benefit.  Therefore, even 
where the employer enjoys a discretion in terms of a policy or practice 
relating to the provision of benefits, such conduct will be subject to scrutiny 
by the CCMA in terms of section 186(2)(a). 
 
The Labour Appeal Court found that the Hospersa230 approach, i.e. that the benefit 
must be an entitlement routed in contract or legislation, to be untenable.  Hoosen had 
a right to retirement benefits in terms of her employment contract.  There was no right 
in the contract to voluntary early retirement benefits.  On the Hospersa231 approach, 
she would be entitled to challenge, through arbitration, any unfairness relating to the 
ordinary retirement benefits.  When the appellant decided to accelerate the existing 
contractual benefits, retaining the discretion to grant the accelerated benefits, the 
benefits would strangely transform into something less than benefits because, 
according to Hospersa,232 she does not have a contractual right to the accelerated 
retirement benefits.  This would leave her with no recourse in the Civil Courts, 
because no contract came into existence, nor would she have a remedy in terms of 
section 186(2)(a) to challenge the unfairness of the Appellant because there are no 
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underlying contractual rights to the benefits.  Furthermore, being a single employee, 
she would not have the right to strike233.  The Labour Appeal Court was of the view 
that the notion that the benefit must be based on contract or legislation would render 
the unfair labour practice jurisdiction sterile.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo was of the view that the term “benefit” includes a 
right or entitlement to which the employee is entitled (ex contractu or ex lege 
including rights judicially created) as well as an advantage or privilege which has 
been offered or granted to an employee in terms of a policy or practice subject to the 
employer’s discretion.  “Benefit” in section 186(2)(a), therefore, means existing 
advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled as a right or granted in 
terms of a policy or practice subject to the employer’s discretion.  
 
An employee who wants to use the unfair labour practice jurisdiction in section 
186(2)(a) relating to promotion or training does not have to show that he/ she has a 
right to promotion or training in order to have a remedy when the fairness of the 
employer’s conduct relating thereto is challenged.  However, where an employee 
seeks the benefit of the same remedy in relation to the provision of benefits, the 
employee would have to show that he/ she has a right or entitlement sources in 
contract or statute to such benefit.  
 
Unfairness implies a failure to meet an objective standard which includes arbitrary, 
capricious or inconsistent conduct, whether negligent or intended.234 
 
5.5 APPLICATION OF THE FACTS 
 
The early retirement benefit was initiated by the appellant and offered to all monthly 
employees between the ages of 46 and 59 (these being the only two criteria for 
eligibility), subject to management’s discretion. 
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Hoosen was not told about any disqualifying factor that made her ineligible.  She was 
only alerted to her ineligibility when the matter was escalated within management.  In 
addition, when she inquired about the other two employees who were below 55 and 
were found to be eligible, she was advised that in order for an employee under 55 to 
qualify, that employee must also suffer from ill-health.  Hoosen’s position was not 
retained in the same form and shape with the same duties and responsibilities after 
her resignation.  Despite management’s submissions to the contrary, Hoosen’s post 
was clearly redundant and she was not replaced, translating into a cost saving for the 
appellant.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court was of the view that the appellant kept shifting the goal 
post which, in the court’s view, was probably done to ensure that she is given an 
“acceptable” reason why she does not qualify for the scheme.  Furthermore, it was 
clear to the Labour Appeal Court that there was no acceptable, fair or rational reason 
for denying her an opportunity to participate in the scheme.  The appellant therefore 
did not exercise its discretion fairly.  Therefore, the Labour Appeal Court held that the 
appellant committed an unfair labour practice by not allowing Hoosen to go on early 
retirement. 
 
5.5.1 JUDGMENT 
 
The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the 
appeal.  
 
5.5.2 AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
 
The court interpreted the term “benefit” to include a right to which an employee is 
entitled and an advantage or privilege which has, in the employer’s discretion, been 
offered or granted to an employee in terms of a policy or practice. 
 
The court concluded that the employer did not exercise its discretion in respect of 
allowing Hoosen entry into the early retirement scheme fairly.  Therefore, it was held 
that the employer committed an unfair labour practice by not allowing Hoosen to go 
on early retirement. 
  46 
 
The Apollo judgment was applied by the Labour Court in SARS v Ntshintshi and 
Others.235  In this case, the court held that the provision of a discretionary travel 
allowance in terms of the employers’ travel allowance policy constituted a benefit. 
 
The Apollo decision will, in my view, pave the way for aggrieved employees to refer 
disputes to the CCMA relating to privileges and advantages awarded by an 
employer.  An Employer’s decision not to grant a benefit and a decision not to offer a 
certain privilege or benefit to any particular employees, would fall within the ambit of 
section 182 (2). 
 
Employers will have to ensure that they act fairly when deciding not to afford benefits 
to employees and, in particular, ensure that they have good reasons for refusing to 
afford such benefits.  The benefits referred to here, include both contractually agreed 
benefits (ex contractus) as well as common law benefits (ex lege).  
                                                     
235  SARS v Ntshintshi and Others [2013] ZALCCT 17. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The definition of a “benefit” has been the subject of our Labour Courts for more than 
a decade now. It has been the subject of a number of fairly recent Labour Appeal 
Court decisions. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court, prior to the Apollo236 case, confirmed that, in order for an 
employee to lodge a dispute at the CCMA or Bargaining Council under s186(2)(a) of 
the Labour Relations Act,237 the employee must show that he or she has a right to 
the benefit that arises by virtue of contract, statute or collective agreement, failing 
which the CCMA or a Bargaining Council will not have the jurisdiction to determine 
the dispute, in which case it may constitute a dispute of interest and the employee 
will have to embark on an industrial action to secure a benefit. 
 
In Apollo,238 the Labour Appeal Court departed from its earlier decisions in relation to 
the court defining the term “benefit”.  It indicated that the earlier decisions were 
influenced by policy considerations in order to maintain the difference between 
disputes of right and disputes of interest to be “pure and separate compartments”. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo elected to follow the Labour Court’s decision in 
the Protekon239 case i.e. concluding that “benefits” fall into the following two 
categories, namely: 
 
(1) Where the dispute is about a demand by employees concerning their benefits 
i.e. whether that it be granted or reinstated irrespective of whether the 
employer's conduct in not agreeing to grant or reinstate or in removing the 
benefit is considered to be unfair.  This category can be settled by way of 
industrial action. 
                                                     
236  (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC). 
237  66 of 1995. 
238  (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC). 
239  [2005] 7 BLLR 703 (LC). 
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(2) Where the dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct.  This 
category of dispute must be settled by way of adjudication or arbitration.  
 
The CCMA or Bargaining Council may, however, adjudicate a dispute relating to 
benefits where there is a pre-existing benefit and the employer refuses to comply 
with its obligation towards the employee in that regard. 
 
Following that decision in Apollo,240 the CCMA may now adjudicate disputes relating 
to the provision of a car allowance (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to 
grant or withhold the allowance).  It may also now adjudicate disputes relating to the 
provision of bonuses (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to grant or 
withhold the bonus). 
 
We will, no doubt, see a host of disputes that are now lodged at the CCMA and 
Bargaining Council following the decision in Apollo241 as the CCMA and Bargaining 
Councils now has the power to scrutinise any discretion that the employer has under 
a contract, policy, practice or collective agreement.  
                                                     
240  (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC). 
241  Ibid. 
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